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AbStRAct
This paper centres around China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and makes 
a case for further examining the possible effects of the complementary 
‘Maritime Silk Road’ on Southeast Asia’s maritime clusters with reference 
to Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Port development with “Chinese 
engagement”	 from	 Port	 Klang	 in	Malaysia	 to	 Sri	 Lanka	 to	Gwadar	 in	
Pakistan	to	some	Gulf	state	ports	to	Piraeus	in	Greece	provides	a	string	of	
valuable pearls in the form of harbours from which adjoining areas can be 
serviced through feeder vessels or railway lines by Chinese government-
linked companies. Whether China’s heavy investments in land and 
maritime infrastructure will lead to the intended development of strong 
and dense maritime clusters with deep connectivity and complementary 
sub-clusters for mutual socio-economic development benefits remains to be 
seen. Academic research to follow these trends, as well as the creation of a 
comprehensive maritime policy, is advocated for ASEAN nations.
key words: maritime clusters, maritime policy, connectivity, Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), China, Indonesia, Malaysia
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Introduction
Since its announcement as OBOR in 2013, China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) has attracted the attention of scholars and journalists, 
leading to the publication of thousands of scholarly papers, journal 
articles	 and	 books.	 This	 paper	 adds	 a	 new	 perspective	 on	 the	
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the possible effects of 
the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ on Southeast Asia’s maritime clusters. 
BRI encompasses the overland ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SCREB) 
and the sea-based ‘21st-century Maritime Silk Road’ (MSR). As 
illustrated in Figure 1 below, SREB’s overland infrastructure network 
includes the ‘New Eurasian Land Bridge’ (NELB) which consists of 
several rail corridors linking Yiwu in eastern China with European 
destinations	such	as	Duisburg	(Germany),	Madrid	(Spain)	or	London	
(UK). SCREB spans five economic corridors: China-Mongolia-
Russia; China-Central Asia-West Asia; China-Pakistan; the China-
Figure 1: Reviving the Silk Road
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Indochina peninsula; and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar. The 
complimentary ‘Maritime Silk Road’ envisages the development of 
key seaports along traditional and new sea routes to Southeast Asia, 
Africa and the Mediterranean region with good connectivity to land-
based transportation routes (Evers, Abdul Rahman & Rashila 2017). 
The geopolitics of Asia is changing fast. Whereas after World War 
II the “Asia Pacific region” captured the attention of political analysts, 
the land and maritime silk road connection from East Asia to South 
Asia, Europe and the Middle East gained in importance and gave rise 
to the geopolitical concept of a continent “Eurasia” (Evers & Kaiser 
2001). 
The	term	“silk	road”	was	“invented”	by	the	German	geographer	
Ferdinand Freiherr von Richthofen (1833-1905), who after travelling 
around China for five years started his academic career as a professor 
of geology at the University of Bonn, where he produced a massive 
5 volume work on China and outlined his idea of the Seidenstraße 
in	 a	 widely-read	 journal	 article	 (Richthofen	 1877).	 This	 article	
concludes that after the 7th century when the art of silk production 
became known in Europe, the silk roads stopped functioning. “Der 
Begriff transcontinentaler Seidenstrassen hat für die fernere Zeit 
seine Bedeutung verloren” (the concept transcontinental silk roads 
has lost its significance for the distant future). This “distant future”, 
Ferdinand Freiherr von Richthofen talked about in his lecture in 1877 
has arrived now though the “silk road” has not lost its significance, 
but is being revived to match its former glory. 
In a departure from earlier policies of maintaining a coastal line 
of defence, militarily and economically, along China’s long coast, the 
Chinese-claimed territory now extended across the South China Sea 
within the so-called nine-dotted line. The sea, however, is protected 
by the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
which grants free passage to all shipping and air traffic beyond a 
narrow 12 miles strip from the coast. Free passage is guaranteed 
even within the 200 miles of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
that grants exclusive rights to a coastal state for the exploitation of 
maritime	resources.	To	extend	its	territory,	the	Chinese	government	
has turned rocks in the South China Sea into small islands, apparently 
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treating them as extended territory, within an imaginary roughly 
drawn red dotted line on official maps. Extending its territorial 
boundaries into the South China Sea is one move, but proclaiming 
a new maritime policy featuring a gigantic development programme 
under the name Maritime Silk Road or One Belt One Road (OBOR) 
(where the “road” is the maritime silk road) is another (Evers, Abdul 
Rahman & Rashila 2017, and many other publications).
We look at these policy initiatives (which were proposed by 
Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013) as infrastructural cluster 
strategies aimed at combining harbours, forwarding, railways, 
energy pipelines, industrial estates and condominiums. From a 
developmental point of view, a key goal is to enhance economic 
interconnectivity and cooperation across Eurasia, East Africa and 
more than 60 partner countries. A similar emphasis on “connectivity” 
is found in the Masterplan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (ASEAN 
2016; Jetin 2017).
In Southeast Asia, BRI is regarded as a new force for regional 
economic integration – filling a vacuum created by the abortion of the 
Trans-Pacific	Pact	(TPP)	by	the	US.	To	foster	 increased	investment	
in countries along BRI, the Chinese government set up the Silk 
Road Fund (US$40 billion) in 2014 (http://www.silkroadfund.com.
cn/enweb/23773/index.html). In 2016, China established the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), “a multilateral development 
bank with a mission to improve social and economic outcomes 
in Asia and beyond” (https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.
html). Its headquarter is located in Beijing. AIIB has 80 approved 
members from various parts of the world: “By investing in sustainable 
infrastructure and other productive sectors today, we will better 
connect people, services and markets that over time will impact the 
lives of billions and build a better future” (https://www.aiib.org/en/
about-aiib/index.html).
An important question is how BRI will impact Sino-Southeast 
Asian economic ties in general and maritime clusters in particular 
with special reference to Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. As 
Koh (2015) has argued, “modern Singapore is a major shipping 
nation and port state. It is only logical that Singapore should be an 
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important hub in the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” According to 
Singaporean media reports, China’s investments in Singapore “amount 
to about one-third of its total investments in Belt and Road countries. 
Singapore’s investments in China accounted for 85 per cent of total 
inbound investments from Belt and Road countries” (Shanmugam 
2017). 
While there have been a lot of discussions about China’s BRI 
threatening Singapore’s maritime hub position, Singapore’s Home 
Affairs and Law Minister K. Shanmugam had this to say at a 2017 talk 
at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy: 
“There will be fierce competition, certainly. We must anticipate 
that our neighbours will, for example, want to build big ports to 
challenge our port. We must be nimble, quickly adapt - modernise, 
expand our own container port; have the foresight to make the 
necessary changes today for a better tomorrow. If we do so, we 
can secure our future, and ensure we remain a key port of call in 
South-east	 Asia.	 And	 don’t	 be	 easily	 rattled.	 As	 a	 Straits	 Times	
article pointed out, it is not so easy to displace our port. Don’t be 
spooked by social media disinformation campaigns that claim we 
are about to be surrounded and cut off. We achieved what we have 
by thinking bold, and thinking big. We didn’t allow anyone to bully 
us, or subject ourselves to the demands of other countries. Many 
have tried. We resisted” (http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/
how-spore-can-gain-from-one-belt-one-road-initiative). 
As speakers at a BRI seminar at Beijing Foreign Studies University 
have pointed out, Singapore is well positioned to partner China and 
the OBOR initiative due to its expertise in planning, finance, logistics 
or project development. According to Singapore Business Federation 
chief executive Ho Meng Kit, “some 60 per cent of ASEAN projects 
are already financed mainly by Singapore-based banks” (MFA 2017). 
According to an interview conducted in Mandarin with news agency 
Xinhuanet, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee views OBOR positively 
(Today 2017). 
After the Malaysian election of May 9, 2018, the new government 
and its prime minister Dr Mahathir have taken a step back from 
implementing the Malaysian part of the Chinese Maritime Silk Road 
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due to alleged corruption. According to media reports in Malaysia, 
China has become the largest foreign investor in Malaysia. Several 
projects have been stalled, and there is some uncertainty whether 
some of the projects will actually be implemented or whether terms 
with Chinese government firms will be renegotiated. Key BRI 
partnership projects include the RM55 billion East Coast Railway 
Line	(ECRL),	the	RM32.6	billion	Melaka	Gateway	project,	the	RM2.5	
billion	 Trans	 Sabah	Gas	 Pipeline,	 the	 RM4	 billion	Wuxi	 Suntech	
Power Co Ltd manufacturing project in the Malaysia-China Kuantan 
Industrial Park, and the RM1.3 million Xiamen Malaysia University. 
“Bandar Malaysia, a 486-acre transport-cum-property development 
project in the old Sungai Besi airport, which is planned to house 
the proposed Kuala Lumpur-Singapore High-Speed Rail terminus 
and	 become	 a	major	 transport	 hub	with	 connections	 to	 the	MRT	
lines,	 KTM	Komuter,	 Express	 Rail	 Link	 and	 12	 other	 highways,	
was launched earlier, but it is also categorised as a BRI project. The 
proposed RM70 billion Kuala Lumpur-Singapore High-Speed Rail 
project, which invited bidders in late 2017, is categorised as yet 
another BRI project” (https://aliran.com/aliran-csi/aliran-csi-2017/
bri-spike-chinese-investments-malaysia-implications-malaysias-
politics-sovereignty/). 
Several other new port construction projects include the Carey 
Island port-cum-industrial city complex in the Port Klang area, an 
energy port in Bagan Datoh (with a pipeline from Bagan Datoh in 
the West Coast running to a new port terminal in Bachok in Kelantan 
on the East Coast) and an international port in Kuala Linggi. It 
is also planned to upgrade the ports in Penang and in Kuantan 
(https://aliran.com/aliran-csi/aliran-csi-2017/bri-spike-chinese-
investments-malaysia-implications-malaysias-politics-sovereignty/). 
The connection across the Malay peninsula is an important part of the 
Maritime Silk Road and its implementation will certainly be treated 
with urgency by the Chinese government. 
According to media reports, Indonesia (a member of the OBOR 
program since 2013) has reaped US$5 billion to US$6 billion in 
infrastructure investment from BRI while Pakistan has received 
US$62 billion and Malaysia US$32 billion (http://www.thejakartapost.
Hans-Dieter Evers & Thomas Menkhoff14
com/news/2017/05/12/indonesia-plays-it-cool-in-competition-
for-chinas-obor-money.html). While the OBOR program may be 
highly relevant for cities along the old trade route between China 
and Indonesia, such as Sabang in Aceh, Medan in North Sumatra, 
Batam in Riau islands or Pontianak in West Kalimantan, little is 
known about “priority areas” (to be) earmarked by the Indonesian 
Government.	 Strategic	 areas	 include	maritime	projects	with	 regard	
to transportation, telecommunications, tourism, industrial estates, 
energy and power.
Figure 2: The East Coast railway line route
Source: http://www.spad.gov.my/land-public-transport/rail/east-coast-rail-line-ecrl-
project
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clusters and Maritime connectivity
Conceptually, the paper focuses on China’s infrastructure investments 
in selected Southeast Asian countries such as ports and the 
implications for maritime clustering. We, therefore, intend to 
concentrate on a neglected aspect of the BRI by focusing on cluster 
theory	to	explain	an	important	aspect	of	Chinese	maritime	policy.	To	
appreciate the importance of both maritime clustering and ports for 
economic development, it is important to first consider cluster theory 
propagated by Harvard Professor Michael Porter (Porter 2003; 1990; 
1998). According to Porter, the competitive advantage of nations and 
regions depends on the formation of industrial clusters: “Clusters are 
geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized 
suppliers and service providers, firms in related industries, and 
associated institutions (e.g. universities, standard agencies, and trade 
associations) in particular fields that compete but also cooperate. Such 
clusters are a striking feature of virtually every economy, especially 
those of more economically advanced areas” (Porter 2000: 253). Not 
only that, the degree of clustering determines the competitiveness of a 
nation or region. Firms located in a cluster have an enhanced chance 
of profitability and are more competitive in contrast to firms located 
outside a cluster in splendid isolation. The main argument of earlier 
industrial location theory of Alfred Weber is resurrected, namely, 
that transaction costs are lower in clusters than outside (Weber 1909).
A great number of studies have been conducted to examine cluster 
theory. According to the disciplinary home of the authors, there 
are	 coloured	 results.	 Geographers	 have	 emphasized	 location	 and	
proximity (Maskell 2013), sociologists emphasised social networks 
and knowledge (Purwaningrum 2014; Menkhoff et al. 2011), and 
economists tend to look at economies of scale and transaction costs. 
At this stage, it is extremely difficult to bring together the results of 
these studies and to draw final conclusions. It has, however, become 
clear that cluster formation and cluster competitiveness is a good deal 
more complex and complicated than advocates of Porterian cluster 
policies would have it. So far it is not entirely clear whether clusters 
make firms more productive and thus more competitive, or more 
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productive and competitive firms come together to form a cluster. 
This poses a dilemma for cluster policies or cluster governance. 
“Natural” clusters are possibly formed by highly competitive 
firms, but firms induced by government subsidies or active cluster 
management may not turn out to be more competitive at all despite 
being co-located in a cluster. Furthermore, the “connectivity” between 
cluster firms does not automatically follow from a geographical 
distance	but	has	 to	be	actively	managed	(Evers,	Gerke	&	Menkhoff	
2010; Menkhoff & Evers 2013; Evers 2014). 
But one finding of Porter type cluster analysis still holds, 
namely that despite increased broadband penetration and internet 
connectivity clusters still emerge. The basic hypothesis that the higher 
the economic development of a country or region (in terms of the 
usual measurements), the higher the degree of industrial clustering 
appears to hold as well. The big gap in our understanding of both the 
clustering process and the outcome of clustering still lies in a precise 
analysis of the inner workings of a cluster. In short, we need to know 
more about what makes a cluster tick, before a robust cluster policy 
can be designed.
What are Maritime clusters?
“Maritime clusters” represent a special type of clusters or sectors. 
According to a study by the European Community (2007), maritime 
(sea-related) sectors (combining offshore and coastal activities) can 
be divided into three different clusters or areas:
1.	 “Traditional”	maritime	 sectors	 (shipping,	 shipbuilding,	marine	
equipment, maritime services, recreational boating, seaports, 
offshore supply, Navy, inland navigation, maritime works and 
marine aggregates);
2. Coastal (and marine) tourism and recreation (coastal tourism and 
cruise tourism);
3. Fisheries (fishing, fish processing, aquaculture).
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Cluster formation is often linked with economic prosperity, i.e. 
economic regions with strong industrial clusters in terms of 
employment	size	often	feature	a	higher	GDP	per	capita:	“The	main	
benefits of (maritime) clusters are the increase in efficiency, the 
increased level of business formations and, the higher level of research, 
development	 and	 innovation.	 These	 benefits	 can	 be	 optimised	 by	
cluster organisations through activities and initiatives, e.g. promotion 
campaigns, structural cooperation between cluster organisations and 
knowledge institutions, specific (government) support programmes and 
platforms to exchange best practices” (EC 2009: 19). 
Cluster metrics include (i) size (value added value / no. of 
employed people), (ii) specialisation in a specific cluster category 
with potential spill-overs and strong linkages, and (iii) focus, i.e. the 
extent to which the regional economy is focused upon the industries 
comprising	 the	 cluster	 category.	To	 achieve	 cluster	benefits,	 cluster	
activities such as promotion campaigns, structural cooperation 
between cluster organisations and knowledge institutions, specific 
(government) support programmes or platforms to exchange best 
practices are required.
bRI: A Maritime cluster Strategy?
What	motivates	 the	 Chinese	Government	 to	 promote	 BRI?	One	
group of observers has argued that a key driving force is economics. 
As China has successfully developed its own infrastructure industry 
as well as rail and air networks across the country, it is keen to export 
this expertise (including cement and steel) to foreign markets in view 
of	 slowing	domestic	growth.	China’s	GDP	rate	 is	estimated	 to	slow	
from 10.6% to 6.5% in 2018.
A cluster perspective would go beyond such a rather narrow view 
and argue that the ultimate outcome of the BRI strategy might be 
the creation of strong maritime clusters for the benefit of both China 
and the respective foreign partner. If that holds promise, we must 
explain with regard to the concept of a maritime cluster why China 
is	building	so	many	ports	across	the	region.	To	answer	that	question,	
let us first examine the interplay between ports and maritime clusters.
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According to Lam and Zhang (2011), ports can contribute to 
the development of robust maritime clusters depending upon their 
functions, overall port traffic and macroeconomic influences. Port 
roles and functions vary “significantly from generation to generation. 
First and second generation ports, respectively relating to ship/
shore and industrial interfaces, operate bulk and breakbulk cargo in 
a traditional manner, with the second generation-type being reliant 
more on capital than labour. Third generation ports are the product of 
the unitisation of sea-trade and multimodal cargo packaging (mainly 
in the form of containers) which has led to the development of ports 
as logistics and intermodal centres offering value-added services, with 
technology and know-how being the major determining factors .…” 
Whether port traffic has a positive effect on the local economy system 
depends on many factors such as the maturity of the local ecosystem 
in which the port is embedded. Increasingly, port-related services 
seem to outperform traditional port activities. The impact of port-
related services on maritime cluster strength needs to be examined 
based on case studies.
Figure 3: Container Shipping, ASEAN 2000 to 2014
Source: World Bank, 2017
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Marine sub-clusters include marine insurance, financial services, 
ship registry, ship-owners, operators and managers, ship classification 
society, ship agency and forwarding, ship brokers, legal services, 
shipbuilding and repair, marine personnel, research, education and 
training,	information	and	communication	technology	(ICT)	services,	
regulators such as maritime organisations and associations.
 Ports and port cities are nodal points in maritime networks of 
differing rates of connectivity. The success of a maritime policy can, 
therefore, be assessed not only by measuring the contribution of the 
maritime	 sector	 to	GNP	 but	 also	 by	 the	 increase	 of	 connectivity.	
The concept of “connectivity” requires some further explanation 
and definition. In general terms “connectivity” refers to the number 
and strength of connections between points of a surface. In another 
paper, we have used an indicator on scientific cooperation to show 
changing connectivity between universities in the ASEAN region 
(Evers	2016:22;	Evers	&	Gerke	2012;	Gerke	&	Evers	2018).
In the context of this paper, “maritime connectivity” refers to the 
number of ports connected by shipping services. The strength of the 
maritime connectivity can be measured by the amount of cargo (in 
tons	or	TEU)	transported	between	ports	(see	figure	2)	or	alternatively	
by the number of sailings between ports, measured by the number of 
ships or the combined DWT of ships.
Container shipping is growing worldwide. Malaysian and 
Singapore ports have become the central hubs in the ASEAN region, 
with an ever-increasing throughput of containers mainly filled with 
manufactured goods. Malaysia, in particular, has outgrown most 
other ASEAN countries and has matched Singapore’s growth rates. 
The dynamics of container shipping is shown in Figure 1, where the 
dominance of Singapore and Malaysia is evident.
The position of each of Malaysia’s official ports within the network 
of ports in ASEAN needs to be ascertained by further research, 
including the question of how these positions have changed or will 
change over time. In other words, which ports are likely to improve 
their relevance to their home countries as maritime nations and 
China	 as	 a	whole?	And	which	 ports	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 surpassed	 by	
competitors	like	Singapore	or	Surabaya?
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According to media reports, a contract has been signed in 2017 
between a consortium of Chinese and Indonesian firms to build a 
high-speed train connection between Jakarta and Bandung: “The 
Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract was 
signed in the premises of Indonesia’s state-run construction company 
Wijaya Karya (Wika). The 142-km line is expected to be built in 3 
years, allowing trains to run at speeds of 350 km/h. For the needed 
rolling stock, CRRC Sifang Co. will supply eleven 8-unit high-speed 
trains”.	 To	 finance	 the	mega	 project,	 China	Development	 Bank	 is	
expected to provide a USD 4.7 billion loan facility. Key partners 
include	PT	Pilar	Sinergi	BUMN	Indonesia	 (PSBI),	a	consortium	of	
Indonesian	 state-owned	 enterprises	 led	 by	 construction	 firm	 PT	
Wijaya Karya, and a group of Chinese firms led by the China Railway 
Corporation (http://www.railwaypro.com/wp/contract-jakarta-
bandung-construction-signed/).
Table 1: At a Glance: China Projects in Trouble
Indonesia: Villagers have not moved 
out of land earmarked for Jakarta-
to-Bandung high-speed rail 
Kazakhstan: Free trade zone at 
China border seen as bringing more 
benefits for Chinese 
Thailand: Financing and labour 
tussles in the rail project
Kyrgyzstan: Country opposes China-
to-Uzbekistan railway line that runs 
through it
Laos: Questions about whether 
costly railway plan will help the 
country
Pakistan: Pipelines, trains blown up; 
Chinese engineers attacked
Source: Straits Times, 13/11/2017, A9
A key problem which has emerged in Indonesia is to persuade 
villagers to leave their land on the proposed route (Straits Times, 
13	November	2017,	p.	A0):	“Gains	for	China,	such	as	access	to	key	
markets and tackling overcapacity in domestic industries, are often 
more	obvious	than	those	for	their	partners”	(refer	to	Table	1).	
Port cities have a long history in the Nusantara. Before and 
after the advent of European traders and their companies, three 
well documented “Malay” port cities stand out: Malacca, Aceh and 
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Banten	 (Guillot	 2005).	 They	 were	 nodal	 points	 in	 a	 widespread	
commercial trading network with a high degree of connectivity. 
“Formerly, as far as we know, old trading cities were actually made 
up of two distinct towns built along the same river; such was clearly 
the case with Pasai, Banten, and Malacca, where royal compounds 
and harbour settlements were located several kilometres apart, each 
town sometimes bearing a different name. This physical split reflected 
a peculiar perception of society: the harbour population on the shore 
was turned towards the sea and the sea activities, whereas the king 
faced landward, indicating that he wanted to be considered as the 
necessary intermediary between inland and coastal populations. A 
neat boundary specified the different roles. The king had political 
power over the land and its populations. The harbour population, of 
foreign extraction, had the right to settle in the kingdom and to trade 
in exchange for taxes paid to the king. But as guests of the country, 
they	had	no	say	in	political	matters”	(Guillot	2005:	44).
Modern Malaysia has many ports along its long coastline. Most 
are recognized as official ports, administered by a port authority or 
port management company. These ports differ greatly in their capacity 
for cargo handling and their function within the shipping networks 
(Soon	&	 Lam	 2013,	 Jeevana	 et	 al	 2015).	Only	 two	 ports,	 Tanjung	
Pelepas in Johor and Port Klang in Selangor qualify as major nodal 
points of international sea traffic. Both serve as harbours for major 
transhipment throughout the Straits of Melaka and the South China 
Sea areas. How they relate or will relate to BRI remains to be seen.
Port cities also have inherited specific social characteristics 
from	 their	 historic	 past	 (Guillot	 2005).	The	 distinction	 between	
government offices, mainly staffed by Malay civil servants and a 
multitude of workers of different ethnic origin populate the port 
cities. As the result of their historic role and as points of entry for 
migrants (now largely replaced by airports) they have a greater 
ethnic diversity than surrounding areas. Their diasporas interact 
commercially and privately with other countries, thus enhancing the 
connectivity of port cities. An interesting side-aspect is also the fact 
that ports tend to have a higher rate of biodiversity than surrounding 
areas. Biologists talk about the “invasion of foreign species” through 
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shipping, a somewhat awkward term given to misinterpretation, if 
applied to human migration.
A high degree of diversity accounts for the high productivity of 
port cities and coastal areas. Not all, but most “silicon valleys” or high 
tech	 hubs	 are	 found	 in	 coastal	 areas.	 Trying	 to	 create	 a	Cyberjaya	
(Evers & Nordin 2012) far away from the coast has proven to be 
more difficult than locating high-tech industries and research labs 
in Butterworth, Penang Island or Singapore. We are not advocating 
geographical determinism, but rather the “value of diversity” for 
productivity and innovation.
The changing connectivity of Malaysian and Indonesian ports 
among themselves and ASEAN and the rest of the world will be an 
essential aspect of the move towards a truly maritime nation status. A 
glimpse of the current situation is shown on the following screenshot 
from the density of shipping in the ASEAN region as of April 2017.
Figure 4: Density of Shipping, Maritime ASEAN. April 2017
Source: Screenshot https://www.marinetraffic.com as of 03-04-2017
This density map shows the dominance of maritime connectivity 
of shipping across the South China Sea from and to China and 
through the Straits of Melaka. Another dense connectivity is seen 
on	an	N-S	axis	from	the	Gulf	of	Thailand	along	the	Eastern	coast	of	
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Peninsular Malaysia towards Indonesia’s Java Sea. A relatively low 
density of shipping is visible between Peninsular and East Malaysia 
and the Philippines. Overall, the maritime connectivity between 
ASEAN countries is not yet intense. 
Table 2: ASEAN Nations Ranked by maritime Performance, 2000
Rank ASEAN 2000
1 Singapore 98.53
2 Myanmar 65.88
3 Indonesia 60.33
4 Cambodia 40.79
5 Vietnam 33.00
6 Thailand 28.69
7 Malaysia 28.17
8 Brunei -0.20
9 Philippines -3.40
Source: Evers & Azhari (2011:120)
Data from our earlier study (Evers & Azhari 2011) show the 
performance of the maritime economy relative to the maritime 
potential. Singapore ranks highest among the ASEAN nations and 
the Philippines the lowest. Malaysia occupies the middle position but 
has improved its rank since 2000. This means that there is still a lot 
of unused potential in the maritime economy of ASEAN countries 
such as Malaysia or the Philippines. More recent data will show 
that Malaysia has moved up and has improved its relative position 
in ASEAN. From the year 2000 to the year 2005, the ranking order 
changed considerably, indicating the dynamics of the maritime sector 
in the ASEAN countries. It should be noted that we are dealing here 
with ranking orders rather than absolute figures.
The great potential of further enhancing maritime connectivity 
also points to the necessity for a stronger ASEAN maritime policy. 
Indonesia with its Maritime Fulcrum and China with its OBOR 
policies are set to consolidate their maritime connectivity.
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More detailed research will be necessary to follow trends and open 
opportunities for a closer maritime cooperation and integration of 
ASEAN countries such as Indonesia. An important strategic question 
for Indonesia is to effectively link the maritime silk route plans to its 
maritime ecosystems.
Several of the proposed “special economic zones” (Set Mangket, 
Tanjung	Api-Api,	Tanjung	Lesung,	Maloy	Batuta	Trans	Kalimantan/
MBTK,	Paulu,	Bitung,	Mandalika,	Morotai)	are	located	in	proximity	
to traditional maritime trading routes, promising good synergy with 
regard to China’s development support and local economic clusters. 
According to a report by Sanjeevan Pradhan (2016), “Jokowi 
aims at building 24 seaports and deep seaports that will connect the 
archipelago’s 17,000 islands together, for this he will need as many 
foreign investments as he can and China’s plans of the MSR gels right 
with it. Jokowi approximately needs about US$6 billion to expand 
five major ports in North Sumatra, Jakarta, East Java, South Sulawesi 
and Papua, and China being Indonesia’s largest trading partner and 
an increasingly important investor can certainly take the opportunity 
to boost cooperation with Indonesia.” 
As Indonesia requires substantial foreign investments for further 
developing its infrastructure and to connect its archipelago, it 
can benefit from the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank. A stronger relationship with Indonesia can help 
China to develop better ties with other countries in ASEAN which in 
turn can help China to dispel doubts about its rise.
conclusion
As argued above, cooperative ties between China and partners in 
Southeast Asia such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia can be 
instrumental in further developing the region’s maritime clusters. 
In theory, BRI can become a key enabler of greater maritime 
connectivity in Southeast Asia and help to mitigate issues pertaining 
to the South China Sea. As Koh (2015) has argued, China is well 
advised to (i) work harder to explain its proposal and to gain the 
understanding and trust of China’s neighbours such as Japan, 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative and ASEAN’s Maritime Clusters 25
Vietnam, the Philippines and India; (ii) to adopt an open and 
inclusive approach so that no country is excluded; and (iii) to solicit 
the views of regional countries and consider those in future iterations 
of BRI-related proposals: “The best outcome is for the proposal to 
evolve from being seen as a Chinese project to being the region’s 
project. It is desirable for China to obtain the region’s ownership of 
the	proposal.”	Given	past	experiences	with	British,	Dutch	or	French	
imperialism this may be wishful thinking in view of China’s rise to 
an economic superpower and China’s geopolitical strategy to secure 
its trade routes. Creating maritime clusters around ASEAN port cities 
may, however, satisfy Chinese geopolitical needs for secure trade 
routes and ASEAN states’ need for vibrant port cities and effective 
maritime economies. 
To	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 complementarity	 of	 BRI	 and	 regional	
maritime clusters, more case study-based research on Asian port 
ecosystems is necessary. Key research questions include: (i) What 
is the impact of Chinese capital and infrastructure investments on 
Sino-Southeast Asian economic relations in general and Southeast 
Asia’s	 trade	 routes	 in	 particular?;	 (ii)	What	 is	 the	 role	 of	 BRI-
enabled	 infrastructure	 connectivity	 for	 the	 region’s	 development?	
(iii) What are the evolutionary dynamics of Sino-Southeast Asia 
port construction in the region and how does all this contribute to 
maritime	 cluster	 development	 in	 Southeast	 Asia?;	 and	 (iv)	What	
constitutes a globally competitive maritime (port) cluster and how 
do Sino-SEA port and maritime cluster initiatives strengthen national 
development	efforts?	
Which country will emerge as the leading force in connecting 
oceans remains to be seen.  Power gains and economic 
competitiveness will depend on the strength of maritime connectivity 
across	 seas	 and	 oceans.	 Traditional	 trade	 routes	 connections	may	
gain some importance with the new railroad and road connections 
between China and Southeast Asia. Maritime connectivity appears 
to be more viable, now as in the past. All participating countries, 
therefore, need a clear and forceful maritime policy to match those 
of China. 
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Considering China’s maritime development strategy and 
Malaysia’s current political system, the following two contrasting 
theses emerge: First, China’s heavy investments in land and maritime 
infrastructure is an opportunity for the economic development of 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia, for example, will make 
use of its geopolitical position by “connecting oceans” which presents 
a possible win-win situation for both China and Malaysia. Second, 
China’s massive investments in infrastructure and ports will reduce 
the sovereignty of some maritime nations in Asia, strangle their own 
socio-economic development and lead to a sinicization (中国化) of 
Malay Nusantara culture. Such a scenario would imply that the once 
powerful maritime position of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia 
with their capability to ‘connect oceans’ will be reduced to just a link 
in China’s global production chain. Both Indonesia and Malaysia 
have therefore raised concern over the economic and political 
benefits of Chinese maritime policy for their economic and political 
independence. This concern is justified but needs to be embedded in 
a comprehensive maritime policy. China’s BRI could even serve as an 
example for designing such an action-oriented maritime policy for 
the ASEAN nations. 
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